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LAW BETWEEN THE LINES
THOMAS

L.

FOWLER 1

"[T]his Court has implicitly held that production of the revocatory writing
itself is not the only method to prove its existence and validity."2
INTRODUCTION

Sometimes appellate judges say too much. Appellate opinions
often contain statements or conclusions that sound like pronouncements of law but actually address matters that are unnecessary to the
1. Associate Counsel, North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts,
Raleigh, North Carolina. B.A., 1975, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; J.D.,
1980, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The opinions expressed in this
article are solely those of the author and do not represent any position or policy of the
Administrative Office of the Courts.
2. The North Carolina Supreme Court acknowledging an implicit holding in In re
Will of McCauley, 356 N.C. 91, 95, 565 S.E.2d 88, 91 (2002). For other cases in
which the Court specifies sub silentio holdings, see Polaroid Corp. v. Offerman, 349
N.C. 290, 307, 507 S.E.2d 284, 296 (1998) ("Therefore, the court implicitly held that
income received 'in lieu of prospective profits - income that would normally be
characterized as business income - is considered business income for corporate
income-tax purposes."); Davidson & Jones, Inc. v. N.C. Dep't. of Admin., 315 N.C.
144, 151, 337 S.E.2d 463, 467 (1985) (reversing an implicit holding of the Court of
Appeals); Holloway v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 339 N.C. 338, 346, 452 S.E.2d
233, 237 (1994). The Court of Appeals also acknowledged implicit holdings, see
Rousselo v. Starling, 128 N.C. App. 439, 448, 495 S.E.2d 725, 731 (1998)
("Furthermore, we have implicitly held otherwise in Alt, where the existence of the
common law tort of false imprisonment foreclosed a direct constitutional claim against
the State."); State v. Nixon, 119 N.C. App. 571, 573, 459 S.E.2d 49, 50 (1995).
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resolution of the specific issue before the court. Such statements are
not the court's holding but are mere dicta. 3 Dicta is not precedential
and therefore is not binding on lower courts. 4 It is only the holding

that constitutes binding precedent. 5 To some extent the rationale,
explanation and analysis that underlie the holding are also precedential.6
3. Trs. of Rowan Tech. Coll. v. Hammond Assoc., 313 N.C. 230, 242, 328 S.E.2d
274, 281 (1985) ("Language in an opinion not necessary to the decision is obiter
dictum and later decisions are not bound thereby."); State v. Greene, 329 N.C. 771,
778, 408 S.E.2d 185, 188 (1991) ("The language in Irwin concerning provocation,
being unnecessary to that holding, was dictum."); Storch v. Winn-Dixie Charlotte Inc.,
149 N.C. App. 478, 481, 560 S.E.2d 881, 883 (2002) (analysis unnecessary to court's
decision, as dictum, was not binding precedent).
4. "It is clear that any statements, explanations, rationales or observations that
are not directly related, or necessary, to the outcome of the particular dispute that was
before the appellate court, no matter how scholarly, insightful or wise, do not
constitute binding precedent, as the court arguably lacks jurisdiction to pronounce
any rule on such 'hypothetical' issues." Thomas L. Fowler, Of Moons, Thongs, Holdings
and Dicta: State v. Fly and the Rule of Law, 22 CAMPBELL L. REv. 253, 298 (2000).
5. As stated in Moose v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 172 N.C. 419, 433, 90 S.E. 441, 448-49
(1916),
The doctrine of stare decisis contemplates only such points as are
actually involved and determined in a case, and not what is said by the Court
or judge outside of the record or on points not necessarily involved therein.
Such expressions, being obiter dicta, do not become precedents. It is a
maxim not to be disregarded, that general expressions in every opinion are to
be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. If
they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the
judgment in a subsequent suit where the very point is presented for decision.
6. Some commentators propose that the holding in a case consists only of the
facts of the case and the outcome. According to this analysis, explanation, reasoning,
justification or rationale, even if directly related or necessary to the result, may well be
worth considering, applying, and following - that is, it may be powerful and
convincing dicta, but it is dicta nonetheless and not binding precedent. See Arthur L.
Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L. J. 161, 162 (1930)
("The reason which the judge gives for his decision is never the binding part of the
precedent."); Ruggero J. Aldisert, Precedent: What it is and What it isn't; When Do We
Kiss it and When Do We Kill it?, 17 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 605, 607 (1990) ("[A] case is
important only for what it decides: for 'the what,' not for 'the why,' and not for 'the
how.' Strictly speaking, the later court is not bound by the statement of reasons, or
dicti, set forth in the rationale.") But see Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U.
PA. L. REV. 1997, 1998-99 (1994) ("I defend a view of the holding/dictum distinction
that attributes special significance to the rationalesof prior cases, rather than just their
facts and outcomes ....

[A] too narrow view of holdings often serves as a means by

which judges evade precedents that cannot fairly be distinguished." ) (emphasis
added).
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On the other hand, sometimes appellate judges say too little. Even
the best appellate judges do not always completely explain their reasoning or say everything they mean. Sometimes statements are necessary in the resolution of the specific issue before the court, while other
times they never explicitly state a conclusion that appears both obvious in the context of the opinion and necessary to the decision. Therefore, the question is whether appellate judges must always say
everything they hold. Can there be unstated but implicit holdings 7 that should be discerned and followed by the lower courts, i.e., that are
binding on the lower courts?
The evidence suggests that implied or sub silentio8 holdings do
exist. They can make law and even overturn express precedent. 9 One
commentator explains that "appellate courts may implicitly overrule
prior decisional law ... simply by establishing a later contrary precedent without taking note of its impact on earlier decisions. Normally,
the later decision is considered authoritative and as having implicitly
rejected the earlier one."l°This point is, however, open for debate. A
jurisdiction's highest court may jealously reject the notion that lower
courts can decide for themselves what the highest court did not actu7. An implicit holding is a conclusion that is logically necessary but is not
explicitly stated, or that is explicitly stated but is not explicitly labeled as the holding
in the case. An implicit overruling may occur when rationales are followed or
decisions are reached which conflict with established precedent but such conflict is
not expressly acknowledged in the opinion. If an implied "conclusion" in an opinion
is not determined to be a "holding" then it is not binding on the lower court, but, like
express dicta, can be followed if convincing and if no binding precedent is on point.
8. "Sub Silentio: Under silence; without any notice being taken. Passing a thing
sub silentio may be evidence of consent." Black's Law Dictionary 1593 (1968).
9. "The notion of sub silentio reversal ... is commonplace in the law." James Bopp,
Jr., Richard E. Coleson, Barry A. Bostrom, Does the United States Supreme Court Have a
Constitutional Duty To Expressly Reconsider and Overrule Roe v. Wade?, 1 SETON HALL
CONST. L. J. 55, 75 (1990) (noting that while the Supreme Court sometimes expressly
overrules a prior decision, in a great many instances the overruling must be deduced
from the principles of related cases.) Raoul Berger, A Study of Youthful Omniscience:
Gerald Lynch on Judicial Review, 36 ARK. L. REV. 215 (1982) ("In the history of the
Court many a decision has been overruled sub silentio .... "); see also Lisa J. Allegrucci
& Paul E. Kunz, The Futureof Roe v. Wade in the Supreme Court: Devolution of the Right
of Abortion and Resurgence of State Control, 7 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 295, 327
(1991) ("Although sub silentio overruling is a common practice in our system of
jurisprudence, it often clouds the law and undermines the legitimacy of both the new
decision and the precedent. Stability is better achieved when the Court directly
reviews the weaknesses of the prior case law and completely, rather than partially,
overrules it.")
10. Richard B. Cappalli, What Is Authority? Creation and Use of Case Law by
Pennsylvania's Appellate Courts, 72 TEMP. L. REv. 303, 366 (1999).
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ally say but really meant. For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court stated,
"[I]f a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet
appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the
Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions."'" Yet
despite this explicit language, one federal judge noted, "[T]here are
persuasive authorities cited in support of the right (arguably, the duty)
of a lower court to decline to apply Supreme Court precedent when the
Court in later decisions has itself de facto overruled that precedent,
although not expressly." 2
This article takes the position that the law can be found between
the lines of appellate opinions. Several North Carolina cases admit to
sub silentio overrulings,13 and one court of appeals case explicitly
found error when a trial court did not find that a case had been overruled sub silentio.1 4 Additionally, North Carolina appellate courts regularly avoid explicitly detailing the impact an opinion has on the
precedential value of an earlier case, and instead invite the lower
11. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484
(1989).
12. Sojourner v. Roemer, 772 F.Supp. 930, 931-32 (E.D. La. 1991); see also
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 693 (3rd Cir. 1991), rev'd in part, 505
U.S. 833 (1992) ("[A] legal standard endorsed by the [Supreme]Court ceases to be the
law of the land when a majority of the Court in a subsequent case declines to apply
it.")
13. In re Will of McCauley, 356 N.C. 91, 95, 565 S.E.2d 88, 91 (2002) ("Thus, this
Court has implicitly held that production of the revocatory writing itself is not the
only method to prove its existence and validity."); State v. Lynch, 334 N.C. 402, 410,
432 S.E.2d 349, 352-53 (1993) ("Here, however, we are forced to acknowledge that in
Gibson we overruled, sub silentio, our recent precedent established in Garner.");
Rowan County Bd. of Educ. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 332 N.C. 1, 8, 418 S.E.2d 648, 653
(1992) ("Our review of the case law persuades us that the second line of cases
overrules, sub silentio, the earlier line."); White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 778, 324
S.E.2d 829, 834 (1985) ("Once the trial court orders a distribution, it has held sub
silentio that such distribution is fair and equitable. A specific statement that the
distribution ordered is equitable is not required."); Teachy v. Coble Dairies, Inc., 306
N.C. 324, 326, 293 S.E.2d 182, 183 (1982) ("This decision was based on the
conclusion that the denial of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12 (b)(1) for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction is not immediately appealable and the sub silentio
determination that sovereign immunity is a matter of subject matter jurisdiction.");
City of Winston-Salem v. Yarbrough, 117 N.C. App. 340, 346, 451 S.E.2d 358, 363
(1994) ("Thus, the Court decided, sub silentio, that holding property for anticipated
development is a present use."); Reidy v. Macauley, 57 N.C. App. 184, 187, 290 S.E.2d
746, 748 (1982) ("We believe Chipley has been overruled sub silentio by Vogel and its
progeny.").
14. Riley v. DeBaer, 144 N.C. App. 357, 547 S.E.2d 831 (2001).
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courts to make that determination for themselves.' 5 For example in
Meyer v. Walls' 6 the Supreme Court stated, "[T]o the extent that any
cases are inconsistent with this holding, they are overruled."' 7 This
language appears to explicitly direct the lower courts to apply the sub
silentio rule in proper cases. It must also be noted that the Supreme
Court does not consistently restrict the lower court review to the narrow "holding" of the opinion, but instead occasionally extends the
review to the broader categories of "our decision here,"' 8 "this opinion,"1 9 "the analysis herein,"20 or "the language of this case."' 2 ' The
clear implication of such language is that the precedential value of a
decision can extend beyond the holding to the rationale, explanation,
and analysis that underlie the holding.2 2
In sum, sometimes judges don't say what they really mean. It is
therefore arguable that lower courts have the duty to discern implied,
de facto holdings in appellate opinions, and to evaluate the effect and
significance of this law between the lines. These are not easy tasks.
What follows are examples of possible de facto holdings that arose in
the language (and between the lines) of several appellate opinions.
Some proved to be, and some proved not to be, implied holdings, and
others are left with no definitive categorization. The test for determining the existence of an implied, de facto holding is still evolving.
Despite this lack of guidance, the lower courts should not ignore or
avoid the possibility and legitimacy of such sub silentio holdings.
15. E.g., McMillian v. N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 347 N.C. 560, 565, 495
S.E.2d 352, 355 (1998) ("Further, to the extent that Ohio Casualty and its progeny are
inconsistent with our holding herein, they are hereby overruled."); State v. Barnes, 345
N.C. 184, 233, 481 S.E.2d 44, 71 (1997) ("To the extent that Blankenship, Reese, and
their progeny are inconsistent with this opinion, they are hereby overruled.")
16. Meyer v. Walls, 347 N.C. 97, 107, 489 S.E.2d 880, 886 (1997). See also State v.
Hinnant, 351 N.C. 277, 287, 523 S.E.2d 663, 669 (2000) ("To the extent that cases
such as State v. Jones (citations omitted) ... are inconsistent with our holding, they are
overruled.").
17. Id. (emphasis added). The question remains whether the court needed to
explicitly state this or whether this is always the intent and impact of an appellate
opinion even if there is no express direction.
18. In re Buck, 350 N.C. 621, 629, 516 S.E.2d 858, 863 (1999).
19. Adams v. AVX Corp., 349 N.C. 676, 681, 509 S.E.2d 411, 414 (1998).
20. Stachlowski v. Stach, 328 N.C. 276, 286, 401 S.E.2d 638, 645 (1991).
21. State v. Absher, 335 N.C. 155, 157, 436 S.E.2d 365, 366 (1993).
22. Interestingly appellate opinions that dismiss a statement of rationale in an
earlier opinion as dictum do so only in dictum - the explanation is always unnecessary
to the holding. See Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1997,
2067 (1994).
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The Meaning Of A Denial Of DiscretionaryReview: The Drug Tax
And Double Jeopardy Cases

In State v. Ballenger,2 3 the defendant was charged with felonious
possession of marijuana. Pursuant to title 105, section 113.105 of the
N.C. General Statute, the North Carolina Controlled Substance Tax,2 4
the North Carolina Department of Revenue issued a controlled substance tax assessment against defendant. 25 The defendant paid the tax
assessment of $3,837.24, including interest and penalty, and then
moved to dismiss the criminal charges for possession of the controlled
substance.2 6 The defendant alleged his criminal prosecution violated
the prohibition against successive punishments for the same offense
contained in the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of
the United States Constitution.2 7 The trial court granted defendant's
motion, expressly basing its order upon the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Montana Department of Revenue v. Kurth
Ranch.28 In the Kurth case, the Court subjected Montana's statute
imposing a tax on the possession and storage of dangerous drugs to
the double jeopardy analysis.29 Kurth Ranch held that Montana's
assessment of the tax on the possession of illegal drugs in a separate
proceeding, after the State imposed a criminal penalty arising from the
same conduct, amounted to a second punishment within the contemplation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 30 The trial court in Ballenger
23. 123 N.C. App. 179, 472 S.E.2d 572 (1996).
24. The North Carolina Controlled Substance Tax levies a tax on controlled
substances and counterfeit controlled substances possessed by dealers. The tax is due
within forty-eight hours after the drug dealer possesses the substance upon which the
tax has not been previously paid. The tax obligation is not contingent upon the
dealer's arrest which, in the normal course of events, would result in the confiscation
and destruction of the substance. As unlikely as this may be, the dealer can satisfy his
tax obligation by paying the tax upon acquisition of the substance and by then
permanently affixing thereto stamps issued by the Secretary of Revenue to indicate
payment. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-113.5 (2001).
25. 123 N.C. App. 179, 472 S.E.2d 572 (1996).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Montana Dept. of Rev. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767(1994).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 784. The Court's analysis centered upon whether the Montana tax had
punitive characteristics. The Court noted, "that neither a high rate of taxation nor an
obvious deterrent purpose automatically marks this tax a of punishment," although
those attributes were "consistent with a punitive character." The Court found the
Montana tax to be "remarkably high" when it was eight times the drug's market value.
Moreover, the Court found the Montana legislature clearly intended the tax to deter
people from possessing marijuana.
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agreed that because he had paid the tax, prosecution of the defendant
on the drug possession charges would subject him to double jeopardy. 3 1 On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals upheld North Carolina's drug tax as "a legitimate and remedial effort to recover revenue
from those persons who would otherwise escape taxation when engaging in the highly profitable, but illicit and sometimes deadly activity of
possessing, delivering, selling or manufacturing large quantities of
controlled drugs. '3 2 Ballenger was affirmed per curiam by the N.C.
Supreme Court in 1997. 33
In 1998, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit expressly held, in Lynn v. West, 34 that the North Carolina Controlled Substance Tax was a criminal penalty rather than a
revenue tax. Defendants across the state argued that Lynn was now the
controlling law. Despite this contrary ruling by the federal court, most
lower North Carolina courts continued to follow Ballenger,35 noting
that North Carolina state courts are not bound by Fourth Circuit decisions, but are constrained to follow the decisions of the Supreme
Court of North Carolina until the U.S. Supreme Court directs otherwise.3 6 In the fall of 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court denied the state's
31. State v. Ballenger, 123 N.C. App. 179, 472 S.E.2d 572 (1996), affid per curiam,
345 N.C. 626, 481 S.E.2d 84, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 817 (1997).
32. Id. at 184, 472 S.E.2d 575.
33. Id. See also State v. Creason, 123 N.C. App. 495, 473 S.E.2d 771 (1996), affd,
346 N.C. 165, 484 S.E.2d 525 (1997).
34. Lynn v. West, 134 F.3d 582 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 813.
35. E.g., State v. Adams, 132 N.C. App. 819, 513 S.E.2d 588 (1999) (although
defendant proffered a Fourth Circuit decision as sustaining the trial court's action,
federal appellate decisions are not binding upon either the appellate or trial courts of
North Carolina with the exception of decisions of the United States Supreme Court);
State v. Dawkins, 113 N.C. App. 557, 514 S.E.2d 318 (1998) (an unpublished opinion
of the N.C. Court of Appeals filed on 1 December 1998).
36. State v. McDowell, 310 N.C. 61, 74, 310 S.E.2d 301, 314 (1984). A state court
should exercise and apply its own independent judgment, treating decisions of the
United States Supreme Court as binding and according to decisions of lower federal
courts such persuasiveness as these decisions might reasonably command. See also
Lockhard v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 376 (1993), where Justice Thomas in a
concurrence stated,
[t]he Supremacy Clause demands that state law yield to federal law, but
neither federal supremacy nor any other principle of federal law requires that
a state court's interpretation of federal law give way to a (lower) federal
courts interpretation. In our federal system, a state trial court's
interpretation of federal law is no less authoritative than that of the federal
court of appeals in whose circuit the trial court is located .... An Arkansas
trial court is bound by this Court's (and by the Arkansas Supreme Courts
and Arkansas Court of Appeals) interpretation of federal law, but if it follows
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petition for certiorari in Lynn v. West, thus leaving in effect the federal
Court of Appeals' ruling that North Carolina's drug tax did implicate
the double jeopardy clause. Some would argue this was a clear message that the U.S. Supreme Court (the court that can overrule the
North Carolina Supreme Court) had upheld Lynn v. West and overruled, by implication, State v. Ballenger. But this was not the case. In
such situations, the law is clear that a denial of discretionary review
never establishes an implied holding or overruling.
It is settled law that denial of certiorari imparts no implication or
inference concerning the U.S. Supreme Court's view of the merits of
the underlying case. In Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show,3 7 Justice
Frankfurter stated:
The sole significance of such denial of a petition for writ of certiorari . . . [i]s that fewer than four members of the Court deemed it desirable to review a decision of the lower court as a matter 'of sound
judicial discretion'. . . . A variety of considerations underlie denials of
the writ, and as to the same petition different reasons may lead different Justices to the same result. . . . Inasmuch, therefore, as all that a
denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari means is that fewer than four
members of the Court thought it should be granted, this Court has
rigorously insisted that such a denial carries with it no implication
whatever regarding the Court's views on the merits of a case which it
has declined to review.
Although possibly a way to predict future rulings, the U.S. Supreme
Court's denial of certiorari was not a sub silentio affirmance of Lynn v.
West and thus did not effect the relationship between Lynn and
Ballenger.
(2)

The Significance Of Logically Necessary But Not Explicitly Stated
Legal Conclusions: Legislatively Created Circuit Courts vs.
Constitutionally Created Superior Courts

In the late 19th century, the North Carolina legislature created
new courts called "circuit" courts and specified that such courts had
concurrent and equal jurisdiction and authority with the existing
superior courts. Over the years, appeals from judgments of these circuit courts were taken directly to the North Carolina Supreme Court
the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of federal law, it does so only because it
chooses to and not because it must.
But see Yniguez v. State, 939 F.2d 727, 736 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Despite the authorities
that take the view that the state courts are free to ignore decisions of the lower federal
courts on federal questions, we have serious doubts as to the wisdom of this view.").
37. Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 917-19, (1950).
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and the court regularly resolved the matters so appealed. Because subject matter jurisdiction is always a proper consideration of the courts,
even if the parties themselves have not raised the matter, 38 the North
Carolina Supreme Court's resolving of these cases could have been
viewed as a de facto confirmation that these circuit courts properly
functioned as the equals of superior courts. But in 1898, in Rhyne v.
Lipscombe,3 9 the N.C. Supreme Court held that the legislature's
attempt to create circuit courts with the same jurisdiction as superior
courts was unconstitutional and void. Thus, there could be no direct
appeal from these circuit courts to the Supreme Court. Justice Walter
Clark noted, "[wihile appeals have been often brought to this court
direct from criminal inferior courts [i.e., the circuit courts], the right to
do so has never been adjudged by this Court."4 ° Thus despite the logical inference from the earlier cases that the court approved of the
equivalence of the legislatively created circuit courts and the constitutionally created superior courts, the Court denied that this was a de
facto holding because the precise issue had never been properly raised
or appealed in any of the previous cases.4 1

38. Bailey v. Gooding, 301 N.C. 205, 208, 270 S.E.2d 431, 433 (1980). ("It is well
established in this jurisdiction that if an appealing party has no right of appeal, an
appellate court on its own motion should dismiss the appeal even though the question
of appeal has not been raised by the parties themselves.") See also Barry A. Miller, Sua
Sponte Appellate Rulings: When Courts Deprive Litigants of an Opportunity to Be Heard,
39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1253, (2002) (observing that it is accepted for appellate courts
to resolve cases on jurisdictional grounds even if the parties did not raise the issue).
An interesting question is whether it would ever be proper to determine that such a
sua sponte ruling was implied.
39. Rhyne v. Lipscombe, 122 N.C. 650, 29 S.E. 57 (1898).
40. Id. at 656, 29 S.E. 57 at 58-59.
41. See e.g. Barnes v. Teer, 219 N.C. 823, 824, 15 S.E.2d 379, 380 (1941) ("In
originally upholding the judgment, this question was inadvertently answered sub
silentio in the affirmative. The authorities are to the contrary."); Anonymous, 2 N.C.
171, 120-21, (1795) ("Whatever may have been the practice, I cannot say, not having
attended to it in this particular - Sometimes a practice may prevail for a length of time,
upon the strength of a precedent passing sub silentio, which, when it comes to be
examined, may be found very erroneous."); Scott v. Battle, 85 N.C. 184, 189, 2 S.E. 70
(1881) ("On looking to the case, the fact that the plaintiff was a married woman seems
not to have been observed by the court, at least there is no mention made of that
circumstance in the opinion. So far as we can see, the point passed sub silentio, as if it
had been the case of an ordinary vendor, resting under no disability, seeking to avoid
his parol agreement; and regarding the decision to be inconsistent alike with precedent
and principle, we do not feel at liberty to follow it.").
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Interpreting Supreme Court Actions (i.e., More Legal Conclusions
That Are Logically Necessary But Not Explicitly Stated): Civil
Rule 9(j) and Medical Malpractice Actions

North Carolina Civil Rule 9(j) provided special rules of pleading
in medical malpractice cases, but the North Carolina Court of Appeals
held it was unconstitutional and therefore void in Anderson v.
Assimos. 42 In a subsequent case, Best v. Wayne Memorial Hosp., Inc. ,
the Court of Appeals stated that the holding in Anderson was binding
and controlling regarding the status of Rule 90). In December 2001,
in Sharpe v. Worland,4 4 the court also stated that, pursuant to Anderson, Rule 90) was void and so required reversal of the trial court's dismissal "on the basis of Rule 9(j)."4 5 Sharpe acknowledged that
Anderson was on appeal to the N.C. Supreme Court. Best and Sharpe
appeared to establish that during the pendency of the Anderson appeal,
the status of the law was that, pursuant to Anderson, Rule 9(j) was void
and therefore could not serve as the legal basis for dismissal of a lawsuit. The N.C. Supreme Court, however, appeared to disagree.
In an opinion filed in February of 2002, Thigpen v. Ngo, 46 the
N.C. Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of the case based on a violation of Rule 90). The N.C. Supreme Court's result seemed inconsistent with the Court of Appeals' cases that repeatedly held Rule 90) was
void. The Thigpen opinion reasoned:
The trial court dismissed plaintiffs complaint with prejudice
because it did not comply with Rule 9(j) and was therefore filed
Rule 9(j) clearly provides that
outside the statute of limitations ....
'[ainy complaint alleging medical malpractice ... shall be dismissed' if
it does not comply with the certification mandate. . . . Failure to
In light of
include the certification necessarily leads to dismissal ....
legisla9(j);
the
of
Rule
plain
language
the specific, unambiguous, and
in
this
particular
and
facts
the
record
statute;
and
tive intent of the
case, we hold the trial court correctly dismissed plaintiffs complaint.4 7
42. Anderson v. Assimos, 146 N.C. App. 339, 553 S.E.2d 63 (2001).
43. Best v. Wayne Memorial Hosp., Inc., 147 N.C. App. 628, 556 S.E.2d 629
(2001).
44. Sharpe v. Worland, 147 N.C. App. 782, 557 S.E.2d 110 (2001).
45. Id. at 783, 557 S.E.2d at 111. "Recently in Anderson v. Assimos, 146 N.C. App.

339, 553 S.E.2d 63 (2001), a different panel of this Court held that the pre-filing
certification of Rule 9(j) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure was
unconstitutional and void. Thus, we must reverse the trial court's dismissal of this
matter on the basis of Rule 9(j)."
46. Thigpen v. Ngo, 355 N.C. 198, 558 S.E.2d 162 (2002).
47. Id. at 200, S.E.2d at 164.
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After Thigpen, was it still improper for a trial judge to consider a
motion to dismiss a medical malpractice action based on a failure to
comply with Rule 9(j) as the Court of Appeals cases clearly held? Or
did the Supreme Court, in Thigpen, implicitly reverse Sharpe and
Anderson in a sub silentio overruling? Thigpen neither mentioned the
Court of Appeals cases nor discussed the constitutionality of Rule 9(j),
the status of the Anderson decision pending appeal to the Supreme
Court, nor the effect on other cases resolved after Anderson but prior to
the Supreme Court's decision.4 8 Yet in light of the trio of Court of
Appeals cases, the Supreme Court justices could not have been unaware of the holding in Anderson v. Assimos. Thigpen's upholding the
dismissal on Rule 9(j) grounds seemed to be a clear rejection of the
Court of Appeals conclusion that Rule 9(j) was void and therefore not
a proper basis for dismissal. But Thigpen did not take this position
explicitly and it can be argued that Thigpen did no more than suggest
the likelihood that the Supreme Court was disposed to overrule Anderson -although it did remain theoretically possible that this aspect of
Thigpen was simply an inadvertence. 4 9 Maybe it carried no significance at all, but maybe it did.
On 22 November 2002, the Supreme Court vacated the Court of
Appeals opinion in Anderson v. Assimos that had held Civil Rule 90)
unconstitutional. 50 The court noted that this constitutional issue had
not been raised at the trial, and constitutional issues not raised at trial
will generally not be considered on appeal. 1 Further the court stated
that plaintiffs complaint asserted res ipsa loquitur as the sole basis for
the negligence claim, and because res ipsa claims are based on facts
that permit an inference of defendant's negligence, the certification
requirements of Rule 9(j) were not implicated.5 2 Thus, the Court of
48. Id.
49. See e.g. Barnes v. Teer, 219 N.C. 823, 824, 15 S.E.2d 379, 381 (1941) ("In
originally upholding the judgment, this question was inadvertently answered sub
silentio in the affirmative. The authorities are to the contrary."); Scott v. Battle, 85
N.C. 184, 189, 2 S.E. 70, 75 (1881).
50. Anderson v. Assimos, 146 N.C. App. 339, 553 S.E.2d 63 (2001), vacated by 356
N.C. 415, 572 S.E.2d 101 (2002).
51. Id. at 416, 572 S.E.2d at 102. The Court noted that in exceptional
circumstances, the Supreme Court may exercise its supervisory power to consider
constitutional questions not properly raised in the trial court, but that in this case,
resolution of the constitutional issue was not necessary because it was not "definitely
drawn into focus by plaintiffs pleadings."
52. Id. at 417, 572 S.E.2d at 102. "The certification requirements of Rule 9(j)
apply only to medical malpractice cases where the plaintiff seeks to prove that the
defendant's conduct breached the requisite standard of care-not to res ipsa loquitur
claims."
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Appeals erred in addressing the constitutionality of Rule 9(j) under
these circumstances, and the decision of the Court of Appeals was
vacated "to the extent it concluded that Rule 9(j)" violated the state
53
and federal constitutions.
The question remains, after the Supreme Court's decision in
Thigpen but before the court's decision in Anderson, would a trial
court have committed error by following the Court of Appeals decisions and dismissing a medical malpractice action based on a Rule 9(j)
54
violation?
(4)

Are Rationales Holdings-and Therefore Binding on the Lower
Courts? Part I: The Status of the Alienation of Affection Tort

In 1984, in Cannon v. Miller,5 5 after an extensive review of the
historical and theoretical bases of the torts of alienation of affection
and criminal conversation, the Court of Appeals abolished both torts
because "the very theory of recovery underlying both actions is without basis in contemporary society."56 The court appeared to conclude,
not that the North Carolina Supreme Court would probably abolish
these torts itself at some point in the future, but that the Supreme
Court already had done so, by implication in other cases. "[T]here is
no continuing legal basis for the retention of these tort actions
today. '57 The Supreme Court, however, rejected this application of the
sub silentio doctrine. In a sharp rebuke to the Court of Appeals, the
Supreme Court reversed, stating that the panel of judges of the Court
of Appeals to which this case was assigned acted "under a misapprehension of its authority to overrule decisions of the Supreme Court of
North Carolina and its responsibility to follow those decisions, until
otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court. '58 As noted above, it seems
clear that in Cannon the Court of Appeals was not claiming the author53. Anderson, 356 N.C. 415, 572 S.E.2d 101.
54. The question of the constitutionality of Rule 90) also remains. Although one
could argue that the Supreme Court's resolution of the Anderson case suggests that the
court favors constitutionality, Anderson could not be construed as holding this
impliedly or sub silentio.
55. 71 N.C. App. 460, 322 S.E.2d 780 (1984).
56. Id. at 492, 322 S.E.2d at 801. The court also noted,
The actions have never fully shaken free from their property-based origins, as
evidenced by fact that the consent of the participating spouse to the
offending conduct, or even his or her initiation of it, will not bar the suit. Yet,
unarguably, spousal love and all its incidents do not constitute property that
is subject to 'theft' or 'alienation.'
57. Id. at 497, 322 S.E.2d at 804.
58. Cannon v. Miller, 313 N.C. 324, 327 S.E.2d 888 (1985).
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ity to overrule the Supreme Court, but the authority to determine that
the Supreme Court had already overruled its own precedent by disavowing the underlying rationale. The Supreme Court's opinion in
Cannon does not expressly deny this authority to the lower courtsalthough one could argue it implies this denial.
(5)

Are Rationales Holdings - And Therefore Binding on the Lower
Courts? Part II: Roe v. Wade and the Later Cases

Sometimes appellate judges may be communicating with each
other when they proclaim rationales that are inconsistent with existing
and well-known precedent while refusing to expressly address the
impact on established precedent. One often cited example is Roe v.
Wade5 9 and the subsequent U.S. Supreme Court cases that addressed
the efforts by various states to regulate abortion.6" In 1991, in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey 61 the Third Circuit concluded that the strict scrutiny review, applied by the Supreme Court in the early abortion cases,
had given way to Justice O'Connor's undue burden test. 6 2 The Third
Circuit determined that even without the express direction from the
Supreme Court, it was the duty of the lower courts to follow the new
rationale rather than the one apparently adopted in Roe.63 The Court
of Appeals noted that as
59. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
60. For a fascinating in-depth exploration of the roles played by the various
Supreme Court justices in the decades of debate over Roe v. Wade, see Edward
Lazarus, CLOSED CHAMBERS 329-424 (1999) (Lazarus served as a law clerk to Justice
Blackmun from 1988-89).
61. 947 F.2d 682 (3rd Cir. 1991).
62. Id.
The majority in Roe concluded that abortion was a fundamental right and,
therefore, applied strict scrutiny review, the standard of review generally
applied in fundamental rights cases. The dissenters in Roe contended that
abortion was not a fundamental right and .... Therefore, they urged that the
Court apply the deferential rational basis test traditionally used to review
social and economic legislation. Justice O'Connor has referred to the right to
abortion as a "limited" fundamental right and adopted a middle ground
between these two positions. She uses the strict scrutiny standard if the
regulation at issue causes an "undue burden" on a woman's abortion
decision and the rational basis standard if it does not.
Id. at 688 (citations and footnote omitted).
63. Id. at 697.
It would be anomalous if the results reached under a constitutional standard
remained binding after the standard or test was repudiated. If the standard is
replaced, decisions reached under the old standard are not binding. We thus
conclude that a change in the legal test or standard governing a particular
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a lower court, we are bound by both the Supreme Court's choice of
legal standard or test and by the result it reaches under that standard
or test. As Justice Kennedy has stated, courts are bound to adhere not
only to results of cases, but also 'to their explications of the governing
rules of law.' Our system of precedent or stare decisis is thus based on
adherence to both the reasoning and result of a case, and not simply to
the result alone .... when a majority of the Justices announce in the
course of deciding a case that they are substituting a new standard or
result for that used in a prior case, the substitution is effected, and the
lower courts are thereafter bound to follow the new standard or
result. 6 4
The Third Circuit concluded that only by applying Justice
O'Connor's rationale in her concurring opinions, rather than following Roe itself, would the lower courts decide abortion regulation cases
in a way consistent with the way the Supreme Court decided them in
65
the later abortion cases.
Several commentators agreed that Roe could not stand in light of
the explanations and rationales utilized by the Supreme Court in later
cases. 66 But the Supreme Court itself was too divided to resolve the
matter in Planned Parenthoodv. Casey.6 7 Despite a four justice dissent
arguing that a reexamination of the "fundamental right" Roe accorded
to a woman's decision to abort a fetus was warranted by the "confusing
and uncertain state of this Court's post-Roe decisional law," the Court
did not revisit the Roe holding. 68 But neither did the Court rebuke the
Third Circuit for its willingness to consider whether recent rationales
employed by the Supreme Court could impliedly overrule precedents
that relied on inconsistent rationales. 6 9
area is a change binding on lower courts that makes results reached under a
repudiated legal standard no longer binding.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
64. Id. at 691-92.
65. Id. at 697. The later cases include Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492
U.S. 490 (1989); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
66. See Lisa J. Allegrucci & Paul E. Kunz, The Future of Roe v. Wade in the Supreme
Court: Devolution of the Right of Abortion and Resurgence of State Control, 7 ST. JOHN'SJ.
LEGAL COMMENT. 295, 327 (1991). See also, James Bopp, Jr., Barry A. Bostrom, &
Richard E. Coleson, Does the United States Supreme Court Have a ConstitutionalDuty To
Expressly Reconsider And Overrule Roe v. Wade?, 1 SETON HALL CONST. 55, 75 (1990);
Arnold H. Loewy, Observation: Why Roe v. Wade Should Be Overruled, 67 N.C.L. REV.

939 (1989).
67. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
68. See id. at 833. For a complete discussion of Casey see Lazarus, supra, note 60,
at 459-86.
69. Edward Lazarus, law clerk to Justice Blackmun, quotes a memo circulated by
Justice Scalia prior to the Court's decision in Webster, meant to sway Justice
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70
Are Lower Courts Judges or Ciphers? Ring v. Arizona
In 2001, the Arizona Supreme Court faced something of a quandary. At issue before the court was the constitutionality of Arizona's
capital sentencing scheme. 7 1 Arizona's procedure required the sentencing judge, without a jury, to determine whether or not aggravating
factors existed that would elevate the punishment from life in prison to
death.7 2 Without this judicial determination the convicted capital
defendant would only receive life imprisonment. In 1990, the U.S.
Supreme Court expressly upheld this aspect of Arizona's capital sentencing scheme in the case of Walton v. Arizona. 73 But subsequent U.S.
Supreme Court cases raised significant questions about Walton's continuing validity.
In Apprendi v. New Jersey,7 4 decided in 2000, the U.S. Supreme
Court addressed a New Jersey hate crime statute which allowed the
judge to determine the existence of certain facts, based on a preponderance of the evidence, which would increase the maximum sentence
for certain felonies from ten to twenty years. The Supreme Court
determined that the statute violated due process, and held that any
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, other than the fact of prior conviction.7 5 Unless
there was some reason to apply a different due process standard to
capital offenses, the rationale and holding of Apprendi appeared to
invalidate Arizona's capital sentencing scheme. The Apprendi majority
expressly mentioned Walton and dismissed any conflict.7"
The Apprendi majority was, however, clearly in error regarding its
consistency with Walton. This obvious fact was spelled out by Justice
O'Connor's dissent, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices Kennedy and Breyer. In her Apprendi dissent, Justice O'Connor stated:
The distinction of Walton offered by the Court today is baffling, to
say the least. The key to that distinction is the Court's claim that, in
Arizona, the jury makes all of the findings necessary to expose the

(6)

O'Connor's tenuous legal position. "Of the four courses we might have chosen todayto reaffirm Roe, to overrule it explicitly, to overrule it sub silentio, or to avoid the
question-the last, the one we have chosen, is the least responsible." Lazarus, supra
note 60, at 415.
70. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
74. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 496.
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defendant to a death sentence .... [Tihat claim is demonstrably untrue.
A defendant convicted of first-degree murder in Arizona cannot receive
a death sentence unless a judge makes the factual determination that a
statutory aggravating factor exists. Without that critical finding, the
maximum sentence to which the defendant is exposed is life imprisonment, and not the death penalty ....
If the Court does not intend to
overrule Walton, one would be hard pressed to tell from the opinion it
issues today. 7 7
The issue before the Arizona Supreme Court in 2001 was the
question raised by Justice O'Connor in her dissent: did Apprendi overrule Walton sub silentio? The Arizona Supreme Court was conflicted.
The Court noted dryly that although the Apprendi majority "refused to
expressly overrule Walton," the case raised "some question about the
continued viability of Walton. '78 The Court also noted that Justice
O'Connor correctly asserted that the Apprendi majority had mischaracterized the Arizona capital sentencing procedure. 79 Nevertheless, the Apprendi majority's obvious mistake in interpreting the
Arizona statute, and despite the manifest and material conflict
between the Apprendi rationale and holding and that of Walton, the
Arizona Supreme Court declined to find that Walton had been effectively overruled. The Court stated:
We recognize that the United States Supreme Court has explicitly
refrained from overruling Walton. Although Defendant argues that
Walton cannot stand after Apprendi, we are bound by the Supremacy
Clause in such matters. Thus, we must conclude that Walton is still
the controlling authority and that the Arizona death-penalty scheme
has not been held unconstitutional under either Apprendi or Jones.8 °
In the 2002 case, Ring v. Arizona,8 ' the U.S. Supreme Court
acknowledged that Walton was irreconcilable with Apprendi, and that
"[c]apital defendants, no less than non-capital defendants,.. . are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment."8 2 The Ring majority
makes clear that it found no reasonable argument that Walton could
survive the reasoning of Apprendi. 3 In his concurrence, Justice
77. Id. at 538.
78. State v. Ring, 25 P.3d 1139, 1150 (Ariz. 2001). In addition to Apprendi, the
opinion also cites the important case of Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
79. Id. at 1151.
80. Id. at 1151.

81. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
82. Id. at 2432.
83. Id. at 2440.
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Kenndy states that Apprendi is "now the law," and that "no principled
84
reading of Apprendi would allow Walton v. Arizona . . . to stand.
The U.S. Supreme Court seemed to state that Apprendi was the
law and that there was no reasonable argument that Walton could survive the holding in Apprendi. Yet the Supreme Court did not admit
that Apprendi had indeed overruled Walton sub silentio. Instead, Ring
commended the Arizona Supreme Court for its refusal to exercise its
own authority to analyze and interpret the opinions of the U.S.
Supreme Court, even when the impact on Walton was so obvious and
indisputable. The Court in Ring stated, "fallthough it agreed with the
Apprendi dissent's reading of Arizona law, the Arizona court understood that it was bound by the Supremacy Clause to apply Walton,
which this Court had not overruled."8 "
It would have been more interesting if the Arizona Supreme Court
had explicitly ruled that Apprendi overruled Walton sub silentio. The
U.S. Supreme Court may or may not have found this to be error, even
though the Court essentially reached the same conclusion. It would
also be interesting to know if the U.S. Supreme Court would have
emphasized the fact, as the Arizona Supreme Court did, that the
Apprendi majority explicitly (and mistakenly) refused to overrule Walton, or whether the lower court's conclusion that Walton had been
overruled would have been permissible if Apprendi had not mentioned
Walton.
(7)

The Art of Discerning the Binding Part of an Opinion, A
Cautionary Tale: Civil Rule 68, Offers of Judgment and Poole
v. Miller
North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 68 provides:
(a) Offer of judgment. - At any time more than 10 days before the trial
begins, a party defending against a claim may serve upon the adverse
party an offer to allow judgment to be taken against him for the money
or property or to the effect specified in his offer, with costs then
accrued. If within 10 days after the service of the offer the adverse
party serves written notice that the offer is accepted, either party may
then file the offer and notice of acceptance together with proof of service thereof and thereupon the clerk shall enter judgment. An offer not
accepted within 10 days after its service shall be deemed withdrawn
and evidence of the offer is not admissible except in a proceeding to
determine costs. If the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not
more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after

84. Id. at 2445.

85. Id. at 2436.
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offer is made but not accepted
the making of the offer. The fact that an
86
does not preclude a subsequent offer.
The language of Rule 68(a) is virtually identical to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 68.87 Rule 68 was intended to encourage settlement of
civil actions prior to trial."" The Rule allows a defendant to make a
formal settlement offer, or offer of judgment, early in the litigation.
The plaintiff ignores or declines the offer of judgment at its peril
because the Rule provides for the shifting of responsibility for litigation costs if the judgment finally obtained is less favorable than the
offer of judgment that was not accepted.8 9 For example, if the offer of
judgment was for $5,000, and the judgment finally obtained was
$1,000, then plaintiff cannot recover for its litigation costs incurred
after the date of the offer of judgment. In addition, the plaintiff
becomes liable for defendant's litigation costs incurred after the date
of the offer of judgment. This cost shifting becomes particularly
important when a statute allows the trial court to award attorneys fees
to plaintiff as a part of the court costs. 90 Rule 68 was thus intended to
86. N.C. GEN. STAT. §1A-1, Rule 68 (2002) (emphasis added).
87. Roberts v. Swain, 135 N.C. App. 613, 616, 521 S.E.2d 493, 495 (1999).
88. Poole v. Miller, 342 N.C. 349, 355, 464 S.E.2d 409, 413 (1995) (Parker, J.
dissenting); see also Scallon v. Hooper, 58 N.C. App. 551, 554, 293 S.E.2d 843, 844,
disc. rev. denied, 306 N.C. 744, 295 S.E. .2d 480 (1982) ("The purpose of Rule 68 is to
encourage settlements and avoid protracted litigation.")
89. Bonney, Tribeck & Wrona, Rule 68: Awakening a Sleeping Giant, 65 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 379, 380 (1997).
The purpose of Rule 68 is to significantly increase the incentives for
settlement by attaching financial penalties (through a cost-shifting
mechanism) to the rejection of a settlement offer that was eventually proved
(by the verdict) to have been reasonable. That is, if a plaintiff turns down a
settlement offer and then fails to receive a greater award at trial, the plaintiffs
role in prolonging the litigation results in two negative consequences: the
plaintiff is precluded from recovering his own costs and is also liable for the
defendant's costs from the time the settlement offer was made.
90. See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985), where the U.S. Supreme Court found
that the term "costs" in Rule 68 included all costs properly awardable in an action, and
that if Rule 68 was found to apply, the rule shifted those costs which included attorney
fees (when attorney fees were awardable as costs). For examples of fee shifting

statutes see N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 6-21.1 (2002):

In any personal injury or property damage suit, or suit against an insurance
company under a policy issued by the defendant insurance company and in
which the insured or beneficiary is the plaintiff, upon a finding by the court
that there was an unwarranted refusal by the defendant insurance company
to pay the claim which constitutes the basis of such suit, instituted in a court
of record, where the judgment for recovery of damages is ten thousand
dollars ($10,000) or less, the presiding judge may, in his discretion, allow a
reasonable attorney fee to the duly licensed attorney representing the litigant
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place a significant burden on the plaintiff to terminate the litigation
when the defendant submits a reasonable offer of judgment.9 1 Upon
receipt of such offer, the plaintiff must promptly and objectively evaluate its chances at trial relative to the offer, in light of the attorney fees
and other costs that may be shifted, if Rule 68 applies. Rule 68 was
92
intended to be an effective tool to unclog the civil court calendars.
But, in North Carolina, it isn't.
Taken as a whole,9 3 it is obvious that Rule 68 intends for the
amount of the offer of judgment to be compared with the amount of
obtaining a judgment for damages in the suit, with attorney's fee to be taxed
as a part of the court costs.
See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16.1 (2002):
In any suit instituted by a person who alleges that the defendant violated
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 (2002), the presiding judge may, in his discretion,
allow a reasonable attorney fee to the duly licensed attorney representing the
prevailing party, such attorney fee to be taxed as a part of the court costs and
payable by the losing party, upon a finding by the presiding judge that: (1)
The party charged with the violation has willfully engaged in the act or
practice, and there was an unwarranted refusal by such party to fully resolve
the matter which constitutes the basis of such suit; or (2) The party
instituting the action knew, or should have known, the action was frivolous
and malicious.
91. In Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985), the Supreme Court acknowledged the
argument that subjecting plaintiffs-who might otherwise be entitled to attorney feesto the settlement provision of Rule 68 might significantly deter them from bringing
suit, i.e., because plaintiffs "who reject an offer more favorable than what is thereafter
recovered at trial will not recover attorney's fees for services performed after the offer
is rejected."
92. There have been several proposals to modify federal Rule 68 to make it more
effective. See discussions in William W. Schwarzer, Fee-Shifting Offers ofJudgment- an
Approach to Reducing Cost of Litigation, 76 JUDICATURE 147 (1992); Richard Mincer,
Rule 68 Offer of Judgment: Sharpen the Sword for Swift Settlement, 25 U. MEM. L. REV.
1401 (1995); Russell C. Fagg, Montana Offer of Judgment Rule: Let's Provide Bonafide
Settlement Incentives, 60 MONT. L. REV. 39 (1999). Some of the issues addressed by
these proposals are expanding Rule 68 to be an option available for both plaintiff and
defendant (presently only defendants can make offers of judgment), expanding the
Rule 68 definition of costs to affirmatively include attorney fees (when attorney fees
are not included as costs, the remaining costs may, in many cases, amount to a
relatively small amount and therefore provide minimal incentive to settle even if such
costs are shifted), and clarifying the predictability of the application of Rule 68.
93. This article will not go into a detailed examination of the statutory
interpretation performed in Poole v. Miller. But it will be noted that the term
"judgment" has not always been used to mean "final judgment" and therefore is
arguably ambiguous-which would justify the Court in considering the statute "as a
whole" and looking to the intent and function of Rule 68-which the Court clearly did
not do. It's also clear that our appellate courts have allowed appeal of "final
judgments" even when those final judgments left pending plaintiffs' claims for
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the jury verdict to determine if the latter is "more favorable" than the
offer.9 4 The offer of judgment must always include plaintiffs costs
incurred up to the date of the offer of judgment,9 5 and that amount
will, of course, be included in any final judgment if the matter goes to
trial. In most cases, 9 6 plaintiffs costs incurred up to the date of the
offer of judgment will be a wash and do not need to be calculated prior
to comparing the offer of judgment amount to the jury verdict in order
to determine which is more favorable for purposes of applying Rule
68's cost shifting provisions. It should be clear that Rule 68's effectiveness would be defeated if the amount of the offer of judgment was
attorneys fees, raising questions about whether a "judgment finally obtained" must
include such post-trial matters. See Gibbons v. Cole, 132 N.C. App. 777, 782, 513
S.E.2d 834, 837 (1999)(trial court could not consider motion for attorneys fees while
matter was on appeal). See generally Michael D. Green, From Here To Attorney's Fees:
Certainty, Efficiency, And Fairness In The Journey To The Appellate Courts, 69 CORNELL
L. REV. 207 (1984), which addresses whether a trial court decision that resolves all
issues in a case other than attorney's fees issues should be immediately appealable.
94. See Jonathan R. Bumgarner, Note, Rule 68 - Should Costs Incurred After The
Offer Of Judgment Be Included In CalculatingThe "JudgmentFinally Obtained" - The SoCalled Novel Issue In Roberts v. Swain, 24 CAMPBELL L. REV. 245, 261-62 (2002):
At the time an offer is made, the plaintiff knows the amount of damages
caused by the defendant's challenged conduct and may easily ascertain any
costs then accrued. The plaintiff is capable of making a reasonable
determination of whether to accept defendant's settlement offer 'by simply
adding these two figures and comparing the sum to the amount offered.'...
Using an amount including both pre-offer and post-offer costs for
comparison with the offer of judgment defeats the rule's purpose since post
offer costs are frequently greater than costs accrued at the time of
defendant's offer of judgment. The purpose of the underlying cost-shifting
provision of Rule 68 is to penalize plaintiffs 'who continue to litigate after a
reasonable offer of judgment, but fail to secure a better result.' . . . Litigious
plaintiffs might easily defeat the purpose of the rule by pressing an issue to
trial on purpose to incur additional costs and increase the amount of their
'judgment finally obtained.' It would be anomalous to allow the plaintiff to
benefit from additional costs of pressing the issue to trial...
95. A defendant who makes an offer of judgment has three options: 1) to specify
the amount of the judgment and the amount of costs, 2) to specify the amount of the
judgment and leave the amount of costs open to be determined by the court, or 3) to
make a lump sum offer which expressly includes both the amount of the judgment
and the amount of costs. Aikens v. Ludlum, 113 N.C. App. 823, 825, 440 S.E.2d 319,
321 (1994).
96. The exception would be when the offer ofjudgment is a lump sum offer which
expressly includes the amount of costs in the stated lump sum. See option three as
listed in footnote 7, supra. For these lump sum offers of judgment the "costs then
accrued" must be determined and subtracted from the lump sum offered before it can
be determined what part of the offer was compensatory (and so comparable to the
jury verdict). An illustrative case is Marryshow v. Flynn, 986 F.2d 689 (4th Cir. 1993).
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compared, not with the jury verdict standing alone, but instead with
the jury verdict plus all attorneys fees and costs awarded by the court,
including the attorneys fees and costs incurred after the offer of judgment.9 7 Thus, in the example above, where the plaintiff declined the
offer of judgment for $5,000, proceeded to trial where the jury
awarded $1,000, and the judge, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 6-21.1
awarded plaintiff $4,600 in attorneys fees and other costs ($4,100 of
which was incurred after the date of the offer of judgment), if the attorneys fees and costs incurred after the offer of judgment were included
in the "more favorable" calculation, then Rule 68 would not apply. If
this approach was correct, the burden on the plaintiff to seriously consider a reasonable settlement offer would be substantially
diminished. 98
a. Should the offer of judgment be compared to the jury verdict or to
the final judgment including all costs awarded by the trial court?
In Purdy v. Brown,99 plaintiff sought $300,000 in damages. Defendant filed an offer of judgment for $5,001, with all costs accrued
except attorneys' fees.10 ° It was refused. The jury's award to plaintiff
was only $3,500. After determining that the defendant's offer of judgment was technically valid, the Supreme Court concluded that
defendant is entitled to the protections afforded him under Rule 68
when the plaintiffs recovery is not more favorable than the offer.
Defendant's offer here was for $5,001, but plaintiff only received
97. See id.
Rule 68 requires that a comparison be made between an offer of judgment
that includes 'costs then accrued' and the 'judgment finally obtained.' . . . To
make a proper comparison between the offer of judgment and the judgment
obtained when determining, for Rule 68 purposes, which is the more
favorable, like 'judgments' must be evaluated. Because the offer includes
costs then accrued, to determine whether the judgment obtained is "more
favorable," as the rule requires, the judgment must be defined on the same
basis - verdict plus costs incurred as of the time of the offer of judgment. The
post-offer costs - the very costs at issue by virtue of the rule's application- should
not, however, also be included in the comparisonand thereby become the vehicle
to defeat the rule's purpose.
Id. at 692 (emphasis added).
98. "Including costs and attorney fees incurred after an offer of judgment in
calculating 'the judgment finally obtained' discourages the settlement of cases."
Bumgarner, supra note 94, at 262.
99. 307 N.C. 93, 94, 296 S.E.2d 459, 461 (1982).
100. Id.
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$3,500 from the jury. The Rule provides that in this situation, plaintiff
must bear the costs incurred after the offer of judgment was made.' 0 l
The Court proceeded to note that the trial court also ordered defendant to pay $1,200 in attorney's fees and $325 in expert witness fees,
but that the trial court lacked authority for such awards because both
expert witness fees and most of the attorneys fees "were incurred after
the offer of judgment was made."'0 2
Purdy thus expressly stated that the $5001 offer of judgment was
to be compared to the jury verdict of $3,500 in order to determine
whether or not Rule 68 applied. 10 3 Based on this comparison the
court reasoned that costs incurred by plaintiff after the offer for judgment were not awardable. 10 4 Because Purdy vacated the trial court's
order awarding such costs, the determination that the offer of judgment should be compared to the jury verdict would appear to be a
logically necessary part of one of the holdings in Purdy. Had Purdy
held, then, that the offer of judgment should be compared to the jury
verdict ($3,500) rather than the total judgment finally entered by the
trial judge ($3,500 + 1,525 = $5,025)? Arguably, it had.
Twelve years later, however, that question was raised in Poole v.
Miller.10 5 In Poole, plaintiff sought $300,000 in damages and defendant tendered an offer of judgment for $6,000 together with costs
accrued.10 6 As of the date of the offer, $420.03 had been incurred in
prejudgment interest as well as $401.40 in costs, so that the offer of
judgment equaled $6,821.43.107 The offer was declined and the matter proceeded to trial.' 0 8 The jury returned a verdict of $5,721.73.1°9
The plaintiff moved for, and was granted, costs for its expert witnesses
and attorneys fees pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat.§ 6-21.1.110 For the
most part, these costs and attorneys fees were incurred after the date
101. Id.
102. "The trial judge did not have the authority to award $1,200 in attorney's fees
because that amount undoubtedly included fees incurred after the time of the offer."
The court did note that pursuant to G.S. 6-21.1 and Rule 68, the trial court did have
discretion to award to plaintiff its attorneys fees incurred prior to the date of the offer
of judgment. Id. at 98, 296 S.E.2d at 163.
103. Purdy v. Brown, 307 N.C. 93, 293 S.E.2d 459 (1982).
104. Id.
105. Poole v. Miller, 116 N.C. App. 435, 437-38, 448 S.E.2d 123, 125-26 (1994)
rev'd 342 N.C. 349, 464 S.E.2d 409 (1995).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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of the offer of judgment. III Thus, the final judgment entered by the
trial court included post-offer costs, and totaled $9,058.21.112

The

trial judge compared this figure to the offer of judgment and determined that it was more favorable than the offer." 3 Defendant
appealed, arguing that under Purdy the jury verdict of $5,721.73 was
less favorable than the offer of judgment of $6,000 and therefore Rule
68's cost shifting clause applied, meaning plaintiff was not entitled to
any post-offer costs.'

14

The Court of Appeals concluded, expressly

relying on Purdy as the controlling precedent. 1 5 The Court of Appeals
stated, "[t]his case is controlled by Purdy v. Brown," and that "[u]nder
Purdy v. Brown, final judgment is the jury verdict; it does not include
costs such as expert witness fees, attorney's fees, and interest incurred
after the offer of judgment. ' 116 However, plaintiffs appealed to the
North Carolina Supreme Court." 17
Surprisingly the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the
Court of Appeals and held that Rule 68 required that the offer of judgment be compared to the "judgment finally obtained."' 1 8 The "judgment finally obtained" did not mean the jury verdict, but instead
meant the final judgment rendered by the trial court which would
include post- offer costs awarded by the trial court. The Poole court
expressly stated that it "determined that 'judgment finally obtained'
for purposes of Rule 68 is the final judgment entered by the court. '119
But even more surprisingly, the Poole Court stated that the Court of
Appeals' decision "inappropriately relied upon this Court's decision in
Purdy v. Brown.'

20

The Supreme Court stated this was because

"Purdy did not specifically address the issue currently presented:
whether 'judgment finally obtained' pursuant to Rule 68 is equivalent
to the jury's verdict."'' 2 This statement is surprising because Purdy
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Poole v. Miller, 116 N.C. App. 435, 437-38, 448 S.E.2d 123, 125-26 (1994)
rev'd 342 N.C. 349, 464 S.E.2d 409 (1995).
117. 342 N.C. 349, 464 S.E.2d 409 (1995).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 354, 464 S.E.2d at 412. In reaching its conclusion, Poole did not apply
the canon of statutory construction that to "determine legislative intent, a court must
analyze the statute as a whole, considering the chosen words themselves, the spirit of
the act, and the objectives the statute seeks to accomplish." Brown v. Flowe, 349 N.C.
520, 522, 507 S.E.2d 894, 895 (1998)(emphasis added).
120. Id.
121. Id.
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did appear to specifically address this issue, and Purdy's order to
vacate the trial court's award of post-offer costs was by necessity based
on the conclusion that the offer of judgment was more favorable than
the jury verdict. It would not have been more favorable than the final
judgment entered by the trial court in Purdy.
The issue arose again in 1999 in Roberts v. Swain.' 22 In this case,
a civil rights action, defendants made a lump sum offer of judgment
for $50,000, which plaintiff declined. 1 2 3 At trial, plaintiff was awarded
$18,100 in damages.' 2 4 To determine the "judgment finally obtained"
for purposes of Rule 68, the trial court added plaintiffs attorney fees
(under 42 U.S.C. § 1988) incurred before the offer of judgment
($21,810), his costs before the offer ($757.10) to his attorney's fees
incurred after the offer ($36,945), and his costs after the offer
($9,722.59), for a total of $87,334.69.125 Since that sum for the "judgment finally obtained" exceeded the offer of judgment of $50,000, the
trial court awarded plaintiff all costs including the attorney's fees
awarded. 126 The defendants appealed arguing that the trial court
abused its discretion in calculating the "judgment finally obtained"
under Rule 68 by including costs incurred after the offer of judgment.1 27 The Court of Appeals agreed with the appellants, stating that
they disagreed with the trial court's application of Poole to the case. In
the holding, the court explained that the "judgment finally obtained"
did not equal the jury verdict. "[T]he Supreme Court in Poole merely
held that "judgment finally obtained" is calculated by using the jury
verdict along with costs."'1 28 The court in the Poole case "did not direct
the trial court to include costs incurred after the offer of judgment in
that calculation.' 29 The court stated what it believed to be a novel
issue as: "[s]hould costs incurred after the offer of judgment be
included in calculating the "judgment finally obtained" under Rule
3
68. ' 13° The court's answer was a resounding no.1 '

122. 135 N.C. App. 613, 521 S.E.2d 493 (1999), rev'd, 353 N.C. 246, 538 S.E.2d

566 (2000).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

131. Id. at 617, 521 S.E.2d at 496.
Since the trial court in the instant case included all costs and attorney's fees
incurred before and after the offer of judgment in calculating the "judgment
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The plaintiff petitioned for discretionary review by the Supreme
Court, which granted the petition. In its opinion, the Supreme Court
reversed the Court of Appeals, stating clearly that costs incurred after
the offer of judgment, but prior to the entry of judgment should be
included in calculating the "judgment finally obtained."1 32 But the
Supreme Court also addressed the basis for the Court of Appeals decision, i.e., the extremely narrow reading of the Supreme Court's holding in Poole:
The Court of Appeals reasoned that its holding was not inconsistent with this Court's holding in Poole because this Court narrowly
held in Poole that the "judgment finally obtained" was not equal to the
jury verdict. We note, however, that in Poole this Court broadly
defined the "judgment finally obtained" as "the jury's verdict as modified by any applicable adjustments," ....
and did not limit such adjustments to pre-offer costs. Furthermore ....this Court in Poole approved

the calculations performed by the trial court where the trial court had
included post-offer costs in calculating the "judgment finally
obtained."13' 3
b.

The Poole result is unfortunate but more troubling are the
contradictingapplications by our appellate courts of the holding/
dictum distinction

The rule that accomplishes the purposes of Rule 68 is the rule
applied in Purdy v. Brown, 13 4 which also follows the holding of the U.S.
finally obtained", the court's calculation was erroneous. Instead, the trial
court should have added the jury verdict to the ,costs and attorney's fees
incurred before the offer of judgment to make its determination of the
"judgment finally obtained". Using that formula, the correct calculation of
the "judgment finally obtained" in the instant case would be the pre-offer of
judgment costs of $757.10 plus the pre-offer of judgment attorney's fees of
$21,810 plus the jury verdict of $18,100 for a total of $40,667.10, which is
less favorable than the $50,000 offer of judgment.
132. Roberts v. Swain, 353 N.C. 246, 538 S.E.2d 566 (2000).
133. Id. at 250, 538 S.E.2d at 568 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court also noted
that "[i]n light of the precedent of Poole, it was unnecessary for the Court of Appeals to
look to federal case law for guidance," which the Court of Appeals had done in citing
Marryshow v. Flynn, 986 F.2d 689 (4th Cir. 1993). The Court clarified that "the
meaning of Rule 68 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure is the same for all
cases brought in North Carolina courts. As such, we hold that costs incurred after the
offer of judgment but prior to the entry of judgment should be included in calculating
the "judgment finally obtained," even where attorney's fees are awarded under a
federal statute." Roberts v. Swain, 353 N.C. 246, 250-51, 538 S.E.2d 566, 568 (2000).
134. Purdy v. Brown, 307 N.C. 93, 296 S.E.2d 459 (1982).
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Supreme Court in Marek v. Chesny.1 35 This rule is most clearly stated
as follows: the determination of whether or not Rule 68 applies is
made before any determination that plaintiff should receive post-offer
costs or attorney fees and if Rule 68 is found to apply then plaintiff can
not receive post-offer costs or attorney fees. The problem with the
Poole v. Miller 1 36 decision is that it requires the trial court to address
the applicability of Rule 68 only after it determines whether or not
plaintiff should receive post-offer costs or attorneys fees. But depending on these costs determinations, the trial court may be compelled to
find that Rule 68 does apply and therefore the court has no authority
to award post-offer costs and fees to the plaintiff. This would then
necessitate a modification of the final judgment awarding such costs
and fees. Thus, the "judgment finally obtained" as envisioned by Poole
that must be compared to the offer of judgment, is really a forecast of a
judgment that might be finally obtained-undermining Poole's statu13 7
tory interpretation analysis.
But more troubling is the inconsistent application of the holding/
dictum distinction. Purdy held that once Rule 68 was determined to
be applicable, the trial court's statutory discretionary authority to
award post-offer costs and attorneys fees was eliminated. Because the
trial court actually awarded post-offer costs and attorneys fees and the
Supreme Court expressly reversed this aspect of the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court's holding in this regard does not appear to be
dictum as Poole apparently concluded. In Poole the Court of Appeals
held that under Purdy, the offer of judgment should be compared with
the jury verdict. But the Supreme Court rejected this interpretation
and stated that Purdy "did not specifically address the issue currently
presented." But it did. Further, in Poole, the Court of Appeals was
arguably correct in its evaluation of the Purdy precedent. In any event,
135. Marck v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1 (1985).
136. 342 N.C. 349, 464 S.E.2d 409 (1995).
137. This uncertain approach is compounded if the trial court is required to
consider the offer of judgment in its discretionary determination of what post-offer
attorney fees the court is inclined to award. See Blackmon v. Bumgarner, 135 N.C.
App. 125, 130, 519 S.E.2d 335, 338 (1999), where the Court of Appeals noted that "in
exercising its discretion [in awarding attorney fees], the trial court should consider all
the circumstances of the case, which include offers of settlement made by the
opposing party, and the timing of those offers." The Court then noted that in this case
the offers of judgment "were more than four times the amount recovered by the
plaintiff at trial," so that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
plaintiff's motion for an award of attorney fees. Is this a legitimate backdoor approach
to accomplishing the true purpose of Rule 68 despite the roadblock created by Poole
and Roberts?
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the Purdy opinion also "approved the calculations" underlying its conclusion, and according to the Supreme Court in Roberts, this should
have made the Purdy conclusion precedential.
Nevertheless, in Roberts, the Court of Appeals rejected Poole on a
similar basis, stating that Poole "did not specifically address the issue
of whether the costs incurred after the offer of judgment are included
in calculating the 'judgment finally obtained."' But Poole did expressly
acknowledge and approve the trial court's final judgment which did
include the "costs accrued after the offer of judgment." The holding in
Poole was thus fairly clear and was obviously not dictum.
These cases leave us with no understanding of the analysis that
either of our appellate courts will apply to distinguish between an
opinion's holding and its dictum. Additionally, the statement in Roberts that the Court had "approved the calculations" and by doing so
had established a precedent, is a confirmation of the propriety of
searching for implied or de facto holdings-yet this approach was
expressly denied in Poole's rejection of the contrary but clear implicit
13
holding in Purdy. 1
(8)

The North Carolina Test for Determining the Binding Effect of a
Sub Silentio Ruling (i.e., Lower Courts Are Not Mere
Ciphers): Riley v. DeBaer

In Riley v. DeBaer,13 9 Superior Court judge, Howard E. Manning,
Jr., granted defendants' motion for summary judgment basing his ruling solely on the negligent infliction of emotional distress [NIED] standard announced in a 1997 Court of Appeals case, Lorbacherv. Housing
Authority of City of Raleigh. 140 Lorbacher was clear and applicable precedent that compelled Judge Manning's decision so long as it had not
138. Maybe the final word for these cases should belong to Justice Sarah Parker who
correctly dissented in Poole on the grounds that the judgment finally obtained should
not include post-offer costs. Justice Parker concurred, however, in Roberts, stating:
[tihe result reached by the majority is consistent with this Court's decision in
Poole v. Miller ... I dissented from the decision of the majority in Poole, and I
continue to believe that the reasoning of my dissent in that case was
However, the doctrine of stare decisis, which impels courts to
correct ....
abide by established binding precedent except in the most extraordinary
circumstance, requires that I now accept Poole as authoritative and concur in
the decision of the majority in the present case.
Roberts, 353 N.C. at 251, 538 S.E.2d at 569. Alone among the justices, Justice Parker
appears to be correct on both her interpretation of Rule 68 and her evaluation of what
constitutes precedent.
139. 144 N.C. App. 357, 359, 547 S.E.2d 831, 833 (2001).
140. 127 N.C. App. 663, 493 S.E.2d 74 (1997).
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been overruled-and, without a doubt, the Supreme Court had never
explicitly overruled Lorbacher. However, the Court of Appeals held
that the North Carolina Supreme Court overruled Lorbacher sub silentio in a 1998 case, 4 1 and therefore reversed Judge Manning's grant of
summary judgment for the defendants.
"By mere implication, a subsequent decision cannot be held to
overrule a prior case, unless the principle is directly involved and the
inference is clear and impelling." 142 Lorbacher announced the standard for a negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) claim as
requiring the plaintiff to show, inter alia, that the defendant negligently engaged in conduct that was extreme and outrageous. In the
later Supreme Court case, McAllister v. Ha,' 43 the court stated that
when a plaintiff asserts a claim of NIED, "[a]lthough an allegation of
ordinary negligence will suffice, a plaintiff must also allege that severe
emotional distress was the foreseeable and proximate result of such
negligence in order to state a claim; mere temporary fright, disappointment or regret will not suffice."' 1 44 In Riley v. DeBaer the Court of
Appeals stated that
[alithough the McAllister Court did not directly state that its decision
overruled the holding in Lorbacher, the same principle is directly
involved in both cases and the inference in McAllister is clear and compelling-an allegation of ordinary negligence will suffice as the first
prong in a claim of NIED.
Thus, the trial court erred by failing to recognize and follow the
Supreme Court's implicit, sub silentio overruling of the explicit precedent established by Lorbacher.
CONCLUSION

The U.S. Supreme Court has stated, "[o]ur decisions remain binding precedent until we see fit to reconsider them, regardless of whether
subsequent cases have raised doubts about their continuing vitality."' 145 One commentator has criticized this position, noting that

[tihe net result of the Court's approach.., is that in deciding if it
is bound by a precedent of the Court, lower courts must ignore the
reasoning of that decision and subsequent doctrinal developments
141. See 144 N.C. App. 357, 359, 347 S.E.2d 831, 833 (citing McAllister v. Ha, 347
N.C. 638, 496 S.E.2d 577 (1998)).
142. Cole v. Cole, 229 N.C. 757, 762, 51 S.E.2d 491, 494-95 (1949).
143. 347 N.C. 638, 496 S.E.2d 577 (1998).
144. McAllister, 347 N.C. at 645, 456 S.E.2d at 583 (quoting Johnson v. Ruark
Obstetrics & Gynecology Assoc., P.A., 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85 (1990)).
145. Hohn v. U.S., 524 U.S. 236, 252-53 (1998).
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which might bring the validity of that reasoning into question, focusing instead on the narrow holding of the case, and whether it has been
expressly overruled. . . . What does it mean for a court of law to
announce that the reasons it gives for its decisions do not matter; all
that matters is the decision itself, the raw exercise of power? After all,
one can argue that deciding in a reasoned manner and explaining the
essence of judging, as distinguished
reasons for one's decision is the 146
from other forms of state power.
Maybe these positions can be reconciled. It is clear that the lower
courts must proceed cautiously in deciding that a higher court has
made a sub silentio determination-and extra cautiously if that determination involves overruling an express precedent. This does not
mean, however, that a clear and applicable precedent must always be
followed until explicitly overruled by the Supreme Court. 147 Language
in an appellate opinion that merely raises doubts as to a precedent's
continuing viability should suffice only to predict the future decisions
of the court-but not to justify a sub silentio overruling. On the other
hand, if the language's conflict with the existing precedent is clear and
compelling, then the lower court must be authorized to declare the de
facto overruling. Rationales and reasons in appellate opinions matter.'14 Lower courts are not mere ciphers or functionaries limited to
following only the express direction of the highest court. Although
Justice Holmes claimed the law is simply a prediction of how judges
would rule,' 4 9 when express, applicable precedent exists, lower courts
should not engage in predicting how the supreme court will rule on
the matter in the future. 1 50 But although the lower courts must proceed cautiously in deciding that a later inconsistent supreme court
opinion has overruled express precedent sub silentio, there is law to be
found between the lines of appellate opinions, and the lower courts
must search for it even if reasonable legal scholars, attorneys, and
judges can't agree as to exactly what that law is.

146. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Separate But Equal?: The Supreme Court, The Lower Federal
Courts, and the Nature of the "JudicialPower", 80 B.U. L. REV. 967, 973 (October,

2000).
147. See supra notes 6, 7, 8.
148. See generally, Symposium on Taking Legal Argument Seriously, 74

CHI-KENT

L.

REV. 317-779 (1999).

149. "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more
pretentious, are what I mean by the law." Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law,
10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 461 (1897), reprinted in 78 B.U. L. REV. 699, 702 (1998).
150. For a brief discussion of lower courts predicting what higher courts will do see
Thomas L. Fowler, Of Moons, Thongs, Holdings And Dicta: State v. Fly and the Rule of
Law, 22 CAMPBELL L. REV. 253, 258-61 (2000).
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